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Other countries have long resisted the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust law. Several have passed blocking statutes to hinder the
discovery of evidence that might be useful in such cases.' The United
Kingdom has provided, by legislation, that U.S. antitrustjudgments are
not enforceable in British courts, and both Australia and Canada have
given their Attorneys General authority to declare such judgments
unenforceable or to reduce the amounts that will be enforced.2 Even
when countries have not specifically provided for the non-enforcement
of U.S. antitrust judgments, it is commonly'assumed that such judg-
ments would not be enforced because of what Professor Lowenfeld has
referred to as the "public law taboo."3 At first glance, then, it seems odd
to find that the Hague Judgments Convention, in its current draft
("Draft Convention"), applies to antitrust cases.
4
The explanation lies in the fact that the Draft Convention sets forth
rules not just for the recognition and enforcement of judgments, but
also for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, prohibiting the exercise
* Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A., Yale 1986;
J.D., Yale 1991. Thanks to Ash Bhagwat, Ron Brand, Andrew Guzman, Fritz Juenger, Mary Kay
KaneJeffKovar, andJoel Paul for comments on an earlier draft. This Article is dedicated to the
memory of FritzJuenger, an irrepressible and irreplaceable scholar.
1. Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, South
Africa, and the United Kingdom have all enacted blocking legislation. For a listing of these
statutes and the extraterritorial applications of U.S. law in response to which they were passed, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATiONS LAw § 442 reporters' note 4 (1987). For a collection
of blocking statutes in English, see A.V. LowE, ExTRATERRITORIALJURISDICTION 79-143 (1983).
2. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 5 (Eng.); Foreign Proceedings (Excess of
Jurisdiction) Act, 1984, § 9 (AustI.); Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985),
amended by ch. 28, 1996 S.C. 8(1) (Can).
3. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International
Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES CouRS 311, 322-24 (1979-I1).
4. Preliminary Draft Convention onJurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (visited Aug. 14,
2000) [hereinafter Draft Convention]. It is also worth recalling that an earlier effort to negotiate a
judgments convention between the United States and the United Kingdom failed, in part, because
of British opposition to recognizing U.S. antitrustjudgments. See P.M. North, The Draft U.K./U.S.
Judgments Convention: A British Viewipoint, 1 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219, 231 (1979).
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of jurisdiction in some cases,5 requiring it in others,6 and neither
prohibiting nor requiring it in the rest.7 It takes no great insight to see
that the reason Australia, Canada, most members of the European
Union, and other parties to the Hague negotiations sought to bring
antitrust within the Convention was not primarily to provide for the
enforcement of those judgments, but to limit the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts in antitrust cases.8
Putting to one side the fact that the United States is unlikely to accept
such limitations,9 this Article argues that the Draft Convention's at-
tempt to limit personal jurisdiction in antitrust cases is ill advised for
two reasons. First, the personal-jurisdiction limitations in the current
draft are unlikely to provide an effective constraint on the extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. antitrust law. Second, a better long-term strategy
for the countries that have so long resisted the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. antitrust law would be to require the reciprocal enforce-
ment of antitrust judgments without stringent limitations on personal
jurisdiction. Currently, the United States has a much greater ability
than other countries to project its antitrust law extraterritorially simply
because of its size, which not only makes it easier for the United States
to obtain jurisdiction over an antitrust defendant, but also makes it
more likely that the defendant will have assets within the United States
against which ajudgment may be enforced. Providing for the recipro-
cal enforcement of antitrust judgments would give smaller countries 0
an equal ability to apply their antitrust laws extraterritorially, thus
5. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 18.
6. Id. arts. 3-16.
7. Id. art. 17.
8. The United Kingdom proposed, and the United States supported, excluding antitrust
explicitly from the scope of the Draft Convention, but this proposal was soundly defeated.
Interview with Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private International Law, in S.F., Cal.
(Sept. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Kovar Interview].
9. The United States has notified the Hague Conference that the Draft Convention "stands
no chance of being accepted in the United States." Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal
Adviser for Private International Law, toJ.H.A. van Loon, Secretary General, Hague Conference
on Private International Law, at 3 (Feb. 22, 2000) (on file with the author). Opposition from the
antitrust bar in the United States is among the many reasons cited by the United States. Id. at 7-8.
Since, as argued below, the limitations on personal jurisdiction in the Draft Convention would be
unlikely to have much impact on antitrust cases, such opposition may be misguided. See infta notes
72-86 and accompanying text.
10. The relevant measure of size in this context is the extent to which foreign companies do
business with and have assets in a given country, because it is those factors on which the assertion
of personaljurisdiction and the enforceability ofjudgments turn. Thus, a country like the People's
Republic of China would be considered "smaller" than the United States for the purposes of this
[Vol. 32
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helping to level the playing field for negotiations on substantive
antitrust policy. Of course, this argument assumes that smaller coun-
tries have antitrust laws and will sometimes wish to apply them extrater-
ritorially, but both assumptions seem warranted."l
Part II of this Article briefly describes current law with respect to
personal jurisdiction in antitrust cases and the enforcement of foreign
antitrust judgments. Part III examines the provisions of the Draft
Convention to see how it would change these rules. Finally, Part IV
examines three possibilities from the perspective of a smaller country:
(1) maintaining the status quo, under which there are no limitations
on personal jurisdiction beyond those in national law and antitrust
judgments from one country are not enforceable in another; (2)
providing for the enforcement of antitrust judgments, but limiting
personal jurisdiction in antitrust cases, as the Draft Convention unsuc-
cessfully attempts to do; and (3) providing for the enforcement of
antitrust judgments, but permitting personal jurisdiction on the basis
of effects within the forum. The first of these is less than ideal from a
smaller country's perspective because it would maintain the advantage
the United States currently enjoys in antitrust enforcement. The sec-
ond is also unsatisfactory because, while it would reduce the U.S.
advantage in antitrust enforcement, it would also result in the under-
enforcement of antitrust rules. The best strategy for a smaller country is
the third option: allow for personal jurisdiction on the basis of effects
in antitrust cases and provide for the reciprocal enforcement of the
resulting judgments. This would both avoid the under-enforcement of
antitrust rules and eliminate the current U.S. advantage in antitrust
enforcement.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OFJUDGMENTS IN
ANTITRUST CASES
In the antitrust context, commentators have spilt much ink on the
subject of prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction.' 2 The questions of
personal jurisdiction and the enforcement ofjudgments have received
analysis despite the fact that it is about the same size geographically and far outstrips the United
States in terms of population.
11. See infra notes 87-99 and accompanying text. Outside the United States, antitrust law is
generally called competition law. In this Article, those terms will be used interchangeably.
12. For the author's views, see William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory:
An Argument forJudicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L. REV. 101 (1998).
2001]
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less attention.' 3 Yet, these issues obviously affect the ability of a country
to make the extraterritorial application of its law effective. If a court
cannot establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, it will
have no occasion to apply its law extraterritorially. If a court cannot
enforce its judgments abroad, the effectiveness of a judgment will
depend on the availability of assets within the jurisdiction of the court.
A. PersonalJurisdiction
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a federal
court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
unless that defendant has "certain minimum contacts with the forum
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."'"1 4 In applying this standard,
the Supreme Court has insisted upon the need for some act "by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws."1 5
Traditionally, U.S. courts have looked to the defendant's contacts
with the forum state to determine whether the exercise of personal
13. See generally WILBER L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAws §§ 3.1-3.10
(5th ed. 1996); SPENCER WEBER WALLER ET AL., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
§§ 5.1-5.16 (3d ed. 1997).
14. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Even in the absence of
"minimum contacts," a defendant's temporary physical presence in the forum may be used to give
a court "transient" or "tag" jurisdiction. See generally Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604
(1990). While this basis forjurisdiction has been used against individual defendants in antitrust
cases, see, e.g., United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche, 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,434, at 98,463
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), efforts to establish transientjurisdiction over a corporation by service of process
on an agent in the forum have been rejected. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co.,
944 F. Supp. 55, 60 (D. Mass. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 109 F.3d I (1st Cir. 1997).
15. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Even if the defendant has minimum
contacts with the forum, the Due Process Clause additionally requires that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction be reasonable in light of the burden on the defendant, the interests of the plaintiff,
and the interests of the forum state. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,
113-16 (1987). However, Asahi suggests that the interests of the plaintiff and the forum state may
outweigh even a serious burden on a foreign defendant. See id. at 114. In an antitrust suit by a U.S.
plaintiff, the interests of the plaintiff in obtaining relief and the interests of the United States in
applying its antitrust laws are likely to outweigh any burden on a foreign defendant. Courts
applying Asahi have routinely found the exercise of personal jurisdiction to be reasonable in
antitrust cases where the "minimum contacts" requirement was met. See, e.g., United Phosphorus,
Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 902, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Dee-K Enter., Inc. v. Heveafil
Sdn. Bhd., 982 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (E.D. Va. 1997).
[Vol. 32
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jurisdiction would be proper. 16 In antitrust cases against foreign defen-
dants, however, courts increasingly determine personal jurisdiction by
looking to the defendants' contacts with the United States as a whole.
17
Although some of the early cases doubted whether there was statutory
authorization for exercising personal jurisdiction based on national
contacts,' 8 a number of more recent cases have relied on the combina-
tion of rule 4(k)(1)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
section 12 of the Clayton Act. Rule 4(k)(1)(D) provides that "[s]ervice
of a summons or filing a waiver of service is effective to establish
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant ... when authorized by a
statute of the United States." Section 12 of the Clayton Act provides
that:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against
a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district
whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it
may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases
may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or
wherever it may be found.' 9
Several courts have read section 12's service provision as authorizing
nationwide service of process and thus as statutory authorization to
exercise personal jurisdiction based on national contacts. 20 Recently,
however, the D.C. Circuit has held that section 12's provision for
service may be used only when section 12 is also used to establish venue,
which requires that the defendant be an inhabitant of, be found in, or
16. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 105 (1987) ("a federal court
normally looks either to a federal statute or to the long-arm statute of the State in which it sits to
determine whether a defendant is amenable to service, a prerequisite to its exercise of personal
jurisdiction").
17. See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1989);
United Phosphorus, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 911; Dee-K Enter., 982 F. Supp. at 1145 n.15; Paper Sys. Inc. v.
Mitsubishi Corp., 967 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Miller Pipeline Corp. v. Briish Gas, 901
F. Supp. 1416, 1420-21 (S.D. Ind. 1995). See generally Robert C. Casad, PersonalJurisdiction in Federal
Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1589 (1992); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien
Defendants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85 (1983); Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely
Federal Jurisdictional Standard, 95 HARV. L. REV. 470 (1981).
18. See, e.g., Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 418-19 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D.N.H. 1977).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1994).
20. See, e.g., Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1414-15; United Phosphorus, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 911; Dee-KEnter,
982 F. Supp. at 1145 n.15; Miller Pipeline, 901 F. Supp. at 1420-21.
2001]
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transact business in the judicial district where the suit is brought.2 1 If
section 12's service provision is subject to the geographical limitations
of its venue provision, then it does not provide for nationwide service of
process and arguably may not be read as statutory authorization for a
national contacts approach to personal jurisdiction, as one district
court has reluctantly concluded. 22 Whether aggregating national con-
tacts in order to exercise personal jurisdiction is constitutional has
twice been noted and left unanswered by the Supreme Court.23 There
is some force to the argument that requiring local contacts is unneces-
sary when the defendant is from a foreign country because federalism
concerns are absent, and it is typically no more burdensome for a
foreign corporation to defend itself in one state than in another.
Indeed, the lower federal courts that have considered the issue have
concluded that using national contacts does not violate the Due
Process Clause.24
A foreign corporation's U.S. contacts (whether evaluated on a state-
by-state or nationwide basis) can give rise to two kinds of jurisdiction:
general or specific.25 If the foreign corporation has "continuous and
21. GTE New Media Serv., Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
The circuit conflict over the interpretation of section 12 also has important implications for venue
and service of process. In general, those courts that have exercised jurisdiction on the basis of
national contacts have also allowed antitrust plaintiffs to establish venue under the general alien
venue provision, which allows an alien to be sued in any district, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1994)
("An alien may be sued in any district"), and to rely on section 12 for nationwide service of process.
See, e.g., Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1413; Dee-KEnter., 982 F. Supp. at 1148-49; Paper Sys., 967 F. Supp. at
366-69; Miller Pipeline, 901 F. Supp. at 1420. The end result is that a foreign corporation with
minimum contacts with the United States may be sued in anyjudicial district.
In GTE, the D.C. Circuit held that a plaintiffwho wishes to use section 12 for service of process
must also establish venue under that provision. 199 F.3d at 1350-51. A plaintiff relying on the
general alien venue statute to establish venue would then have to rely on the long-arm statute of
the forum state to obtain service of process. See FED. R. Crv. P. 4(k)(1)(A). The end result is that a
foreign corporation may only be sued where it has some sort of local contacts, either contacts with
the judicial district in which the suit is brought sufficient to satisfy the venue provision of section
12 or contacts with the forum state sufficient to allow for service of process under the relevant state
long-arm statute.
22. SeeIn reVitamins Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2000).
23. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987); Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n* (1987).
24. See Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1415-17; Dee-K Enter., 982 F. Supp. at 1145 n.15; Paper Sys., 967 F.
Supp. at 369; Miller Pipeline, 901 F. Supp. at 1421-23; Centronics Data Computer Corp. v.
Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 663-64 (D.N.H. 1977).
25. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 & nn.8-9
(1984); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1136-64 (1966).
[Vol. 32
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systematic" business contacts with the forum, the court will have
"general jurisdiction" to hear any claim against the defendant, even if
that claim is not related to the defendant's contacts with the forum.26 If
the foreign corporation's contacts with the forum are more limited but
the claims against it arise out of those contacts, the court will have
"specific jurisdiction" to hear only claims arising from those contacts. 27
General jurisdiction plays an important role in many international
antitrust cases for the simple reason that in many cases the gravamen of
the complaint is that the foreign defendant refused to do business in the
United States. This is typically true in cases involving illegal boycotts,
28
and in some cases involving cartels.29 In such cases, the cause of action
does not arise from the defendant's contacts with the forum but rather
from its lack of contacts with the forum, which means that personal
jurisdiction must generally be based on the defendant's unrelated,
"continuous and systematic" business contacts with the forum. Simi-
larly, in price-fixing cases where the defendants have not sold their
products directly into the United States, courts have relied on general
jurisdiction due to the absence of contacts with the United States out of
which the claim arose.3 0
There are two somewhat controversial theories of specific jurisdic-
tion that are worth mentioning at this point because they can some-
times substitute for general jurisdiction in cases where a foreign
26. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416; Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445
(1952). In the antitrust context, the question is frequently put in terms of whether the defendant
"transacts business" in the forum, a phrase drawn from the venue provision of the Clayton Act. See
15 U.S.C. § 22 (1994). The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase as requiring that a foreign
defendant transact business within the district of a "substantial character." United States v.
Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795, 807 (1948); Eastman Kodak Co. v. S. Photo Materials Co.,
273 U.S. 359, 373 (1927).
27. A single contact with the forum may be sufficient if the cause of action arises from it.
McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,223 (1957).
28. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F. Supp. 55, 62 (D. Mass. 1996),
reversed on other grounds, 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). In such cases, the U.S. buyers might also be
precluded from bringing an action for damages by the indirect-purchaser rule. See Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977). However, U.S. buyers may avoid Illinois Brick by showing
that the direct purchasers were part of the price-fixing conspiracy or that the sellers owned or
controlled the direct purchasers. See Dee-K Enter., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 982 F. Supp. 1138,
1151-55 (E.D. Va. 1997). The indirect-purchaser rule would also not bar the U.S. buyers from
bringing an action for injunctive relief, see Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1172
(8th Cir. 1998), and would not prevent the United States from bringing suit, assuming that the
court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
2001]
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defendant lacks sufficient contacts with the forum to support general
jurisdiction: an "effects theory" of personal jurisdiction 3' and a "con-
spiracy theory" of personal jurisdiction. The Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts states that jurisdiction may be exercised on the basis of effects
in the forum of conduct that occur elsewhere. 2 In Calder v. Jones, the
Supreme Court held that it was constitutional for a California court to
exercise specificjurisdiction in a libel suit "based on the 'effects' of [the
defendants'] Florida conduct in California., 33 Whether the same is
true in antitrust cases is an important question. 4 Prior to Calder, the
courts were divided on the issue, with some holding that the tortious
effects within the forum resulting from anticompetitive conduct out-
side the forum could be used to establish personal jurisdiction,3 5 and
others holding that they could not.36 Since Calder, however, the few
31. International lawyers in the United States tend to think of effects as a basis for
prescriptive jurisdiction rather than judicial jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAw § 402 (1) (1987) (listing effects within a country's territory as a basis forjurisdiction
to prescribe). The effects principle is particularly well-established in antitrust cases. See, e.g.,
Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 795-96; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS §§ 37 & 50 (1971); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2)(j) (1987) (stating that "a state's exercise of
jurisdiction to adjudicate ... is reasonable if... the person, whether natural or juridical, had
carried on outside the state an activity having a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within
the state").
33. Calder v.Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). In Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S.
84 (1978), the Supreme Court had previously held that an effects theory would not support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident husband in a divorce and child-custody
dispute, but the Court expressly distinguished that situation from those involving wrongful activity
outside a state causing injury within the state such as ."commercial activity affecting state
residents." Id. at 96.
34. For arguments in favor of an effects theory of personal jurisdiction in antitrust cases, see
Daniel J. Capra, Selecting an Appropriate Federal Court in an International Antitrust Case: Personal
Jurisdiction and Venue, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 401, 422-24 (1986); Herbert Hovenkamp, Personal
Jurisdiction and Venue in Private Antitrust Actions in the Federal Courts: A Policy Analysis, 67 IOWA L. REv.
485,493-96 (1982).
35. See, e.g., A.L. Black v. Acme Mkts. Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 683-86 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that
"[d] elictual conduct violative of the antitrust laws may be treated analogously to tortious conduct"
for personal jurisdiction and holding that effects within the forum plus unrelated purchases from
the forum were sufficient for personal jurisdiction); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannes-
mann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 668 (D.N.H. 1977) (noting that alleged violations of antitrust laws
"were directly aimed at the plaintiff in New Hampshire"); Pac. Tobacco Corp. v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
338 F. Supp. 842, 845 (D. Ore. 1972) ("[A] person choosing to embark upon a course of conduct
with predictably injurious consequences to persons in a distant state should have no legitimate
objection to defending his conduct in the courts of that state.").
36. Sportmart, Inc. v. Frisch, 537 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("The fact that
Sportmart may have suffered injury here, without more, will not support the exercise of personal
[Vol. 32
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courts to have considered the issue have held that effects may be used
to establish jurisdiction inan antitrust case so long as the anticompeti-
tive conduct is intentionally targeted at the forum.
3 7
In cases involving antitrust conspiracies, courts have also permitted
the exercise ofpersonal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based on
the in-forum activities of its co-conspirators, even though the foreign
defendant had "no real contact with the forum state and no direct
business relations tied to the forum state.",3  The conspiracy theory of
jurisdiction or create venue in an antitrust case such as the one at bar."); Cascade Steel Rolling
Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 499 F. Supp. 829, 840-41 (D. Ore. 1980) (rejecting "target
theory" ofjurisdiction); Weinstein v. Norman M. Morris Corp., 432 F. Supp. 337, 345 (E.D. Mich.
1977) ("The allegation of conspiratorial activities having tortious consequences in this district is
not sufficient as a basis forjurisdiction in the absence of any other contacts."); I.S. Joseph Co. v.
Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1023, 1025 (D. Minn. 1976) (rejecting argument
that tortious injury within a state satisfies Due Process Clause); West Va. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 689, 696 (D. Minn. 1967) (rejecting "target theory" ofjurisdiction).
37. See Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp, 197 F.3d 694, 719 (5th Cir 1999), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 275 (2000) (stating "[tihe allegation that Telmex shut down these lines in order
to harm a Texas business whose services were legal in Mexico suffices to confer personal
jurisdiction over Telmex for the injuries suffered in Texas"); Insultherm, Inc. v. Tank Insulation
Int'l, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 465, 469 (S.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 104 F.3d 83 (5th Cir. 1997)
("[B]ecause Thermacon's actions were aimed at Texas and it knew the brunt of its actions would
be felt by TII in Texas, Thermacon should reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in
Texas to answer for its conduct."); Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 872 F. Supp. 81,
87 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[Pjersonal jurisdiction may be asserted by courts where a foreign corpora-
tion, through an act performed elsewhere, causes an effect in the United States."); County of
Stanislaus v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 1995 WL 819149, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 1995) ("The foreseeable
forum effects of A & S's foreign acts satisfy the purposeful availment requirement."); Execu-Tech
Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 585-86 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 58 (2000) (finding the nexus between defendant and retail price of fax paper in Florida
sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction in price-fixing suit under Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act despite no sales by defendant in Florida); see also Santana Prods., Inc. v.
Bobrick Washroom Equip., 14 F. Supp. 2d 710, 716-17 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that "[d]ue
process requires that in order to exercise specific personal jurisdiction based upon tortious
conduct outside the forum state that causes injury within the forum state, the defendant must
actually target the forum state" and that defendant's tortious conduct was not so targeted);
Karsten Manuf. Corp. v. United States Golf Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. 1429, 1433-34 (D. Ariz. 1990)
(holding that "the purposeful availment requirement may be satisfied if the defendant intention-
ally directed his activities into the forum" but that defendant did not do so). But see Sea-Roy Corp.
v. Parts R Part, Inc., 1996 WL 557857, at *4 (M.D.N.C. 1996) ("'The fact that [Plaintiffs] may have
suffered injury here, without more, will not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction or create
venue in an antitrust case.'" (quoting Sportmart, 537 F. Supp. at 1259)).
38. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 904,912 (N.D. IIl. 1999); see
also In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d 26, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2000); Santana Prods., 14 F.
Supp. 2d at 718. Here, one must distinguish between using a co-conspirator's activities to establish
personal jurisdiction, which the courts have permitted, and using those activities to satisfy section
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jurisdiction generally requires a plaintiff to: "(1) make a prima facie
factual showing of a conspiracy ... ; (2) allege specific facts warranting
the inference that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy; and
(3) show that the defendant's co-conspirator committed a tortious act
pursuant to the conspiracy in the forum."39
In sum, antitrust cases frequently present factual situations in which
the cause of action does not arise out of any direct contact between the
defendant and the forum. U.S. courts have tended to exercise general
jurisdiction based on the defendant's unrelated "continuous and system-
atic" business contacts with the forum. They have also exercised specific
jurisdiction based either on the effects within the forum of the defen7
dant's conduct elsewhere or on the conduct of the defendant's co-
conspirators within the forum.
B. Enforcement ofJudgments
The current law concerning the enforcement of foreign antitrust
judgments is easier to describe: such judgments are commonly as-
sumed to be unenforceable outside of the jurisdiction that rendered
them.4 ° It is well established that courts will not enforce foreign "penal"
law, 41 and antitrust law (or at least U.S. antitrust law) is often assumed
12 of the Clayton Act's "transacting business" requirement for venue purposes, which the courts
have tended to disapprove. See, e.g., Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491
(9th Cir. 1979); Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. Nat'l Theatres Corp., 248 F.2d 833, 836 (2d Cir. 1957); see
also Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953) (doubting validity of
co-conspirator theory of venue).
39. United Phosphorus, 43 F. Supp. at 912 (applying Illinois law). See generally Ann A]thouse, The
Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish in PersonamJurisdiction: A Due Process Analysis, 52 FoRDtaM L. REv.
234 (1983).
40. See, e.g., Capital Currency Exch., N.V. v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC, 155 F.3d 603, 609
(2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1067 (1999) (noting English courts will not enforce the
Sherman Act.); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 568 F. Supp. 811, 817 (D.D.C. 1983)
("British courts could not and would not enforce the American antitrust laws."); British Airways
Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1985] App. Cas. 58, 79 (appeal taken from Eng.) ("The Clayton Act,
which creates the civil remedy with threefold damages for criminal offences under the Sherman
Act is, under English rules of conflict of laws, purely territorial in its application."); British Nylon
Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., [1955] Ch. 37, 45 (1954) (Danckwerts,J.) ("The
judge was applying an enactment of Congress, which has no application to the United Kingdom,
of course.. ").
41. SeeHuntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] App. Cas. 150
(P.C. 1892). A report of the International Law Association in 1988 concluded that there was a
"unanimous practice in the courts of the States examined of refusing to enforce, even indirectly,
foreign penal laws." International Committee on Transnational Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Public Laws, INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE 63D CONFERENCE 753 (1988) [hereinafter ILA Report].
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to be penal.4 2 Alternatively, some commentators have asserted that
there is a prohibition against enforcing foreign "public" law,43 which
would include antitrust law.44
Beyond these rules, developed by common law courts or as interpre-
tations of various civil law codes, a few countries (in reaction to the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law) have provided by
legislation that foreign antitrust judgments are not enforceable. In the
United Kingdom, section 5 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act
provides that judgments for multiple damages and any other antitrust
judgment specified by an order of the British Secretary of State are not
enforceable either under British legislation providing for the enforce-
42. See, e.g., I DicEy & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 101 n.26 (Lawrence Collins ed., 12th
ed. 1993) ("an action for treble damages under U.S. anti-trust law may be an action for a penalty");
Otto Kahn-Freund, English Contracts and American Antitrust Law: The Nylon Patent Case, 18 MOD. L.
REv. 65, 69 (1955) ("The jurisdiction of the Federal Courts under the Anti-Trust laws is a penal
jurisdiction, no matter whether it is exercised in criminal or in equitable proceedings."); Indus.
Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007
(1982) ("Since it is a well-established principle of international law that '[t]he Courts of no
country execute the penal laws of another,' .. . we have little doubt that the Indonesian courts
would quite properly refuse to entertain plaintiffs' Sherman Act claim.").
The assumption is not well-founded, for under the definitions of"penal law" set forth by the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Privy Council in the two Huntington decisions, a judgment is not
"penal" unless the plaintiff has sought recovery on behalf of the state, as in a qui tam suit. See
Huntington, 146 U.S. at 673-74; Huntington, [1893] App. Cas. at 157-58. For further discussion of
the point, see F.A. Mann, The International Enforcement of Public Rights, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
603, 614-15 (1987).
43. In common-law countries, this prohibition is based on a combination of the rule against
enforcing foreign penal law and the rule against enforcing foreign tax law, see, e.g., British
Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Harden, 41 D.L.R. 721
(Can. 1963); Gov't of India v. Taylor, [1955] App. Cas. 491 (appeal taken from Eng.), rules that
were quite distinct historically. Dicey & Morris states that "the prohibitions on the enforcement of
penal and revenue laws are examples of a wider principle that a state cannot enforce its public laws
or its political or prerogative rights," I DIcEY & MORRIS, supra note 42, at 103, and some courts have
followed them in this respect. See, e.g., U.S. v. Inkley, [1989] Q.B. 255, 264 (Eng. C.A.).
Civil law countries also generally prohibit the enforcement of foreign public law. See ILA
Report, supra note 41, at 730 ("The general approach of German courts has been one of
non-applicability of foreign public law beyond the respective national borders."); id. at 736 ("The
basic attitude in Norway is that foreign public law claims will not be adjudicated upon as such or
enforced in other ways unless a statute or treaty so provides."); id. at 741 ("Public law rules are said
not to be enforced by a Swedish Court."). But see Swiss Federal Statute on Private International
Law, art. 13 ("A foreign provision is not inapplicable for the sole reason that it is characterized as
public law."), translated in 37 AM.J. COMp. L. 193 (1989).
44. 1 Dicmw & MORRIS, supra note 42, at 107 ("The public laws involved would include ...
anti-trust legislation."). Cf Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 325 (questioning whether foreign antitrust
law should be denied enforcement under a "public law tabu").
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ment of foreign judgments or at common law.45 Australia and Canada
have similar legislation permitting their Attorneys General to declare
an antitrust judgment unenforceable or reduce the amount of the
judgment for purposes of enforcement. 46 Thus, a U.S. antitrust plain-
tiff who wins ajudgment against a foreign defendant must look to the
defendant's assets within the United States to satisfy thatjudgment.
III. THE DRAFT HAGUEJUDGMENTS CONVENTION
European countries have long provided for the enforcement of
foreignjudgments by treaty under the Brussels 47 and Lugano 48 Conven-
tions. The United States, on the other hand, is not a party to any treaty
providing for the reciprocal enforcement of foreign judgments. In
1992, the United States proposed negotiations for a multilateral judg-
ments convention under the auspices of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law.49 The Draft Convention is the result of those
negotiations.
Like the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, the Draft Convention
not only provides for the enforcement of foreign judgments, but also
sets forth rules for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the courts of
one signatory country over habitual residents of another. 50 The current
draft contemplates what is called a "mixed convention."5 ' It contains:
(1) a "white list" of bases on which the courts of signatory nations will
be required to take personal jurisdiction; 52 (2) a "black list" of bases on
45. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 5.
46. Foreign Proceedings (Excess ofJurisdiction) Act, 1984, § 9 (Austl.); Foreign Extraterrito-
rial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985), amended by ch. 28, 1996 S.C. 8(1) (Can.).
47. The Brussels Convention applies between Members of the European Union. See Conven-
tion onJurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27,
1968, 1972 O-J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969). The Brussels Convention has been
amended since 1968, and the revised text may be found at 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 1413 (1990) [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
48. The Lugano Convention applies between members of the European Union and the
European Free Trade Association (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland).
SeeConvention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Sept. 16, 1988, art. 1, O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989).
49. See generally Peter H. Pfund, The Project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to
Prepare a Convention onJurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7 (1998) (providing background on the origins of the
Convention).
50. See Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 2.
51. See Arthur T. von Mehren, EnforcingJudgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design of Recognition
Conventions, 24 BRooK.J. INT'L L. 17, 25-28 (1998).
52. See Draft Convention, supra note 4, arts. 3-16.
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which the courts of signatory nations will be prohibited from taking
personal jurisdiction;5" and (3) a "gray area" which will allow signatory
nations to assert personal jurisdiction on bases that are neither prohib-
ited nor required,54 but which will not require other signatory nations
to enforce those judgments.
55
The Draft Convention's scope is limited to "civil and commercial
matters," with "revenue, customs, [and] administrative matters" being
specifically excluded. 56 The phrase "civil and commercial matters" by
itself would have left the Draft Convention's applicability to antitrust
cases ambiguous, 57 but a provision in Article 10 of the Draft Conven-
tion makes clear that it does apply to antitrust. Article 10(1) sets forth
the required bases forjurisdiction in tort cases, allowing the plaintiff to
bring an action in the courts of the country: (a) "in which the act or
omission that caused the injury occurred," or (b) "in which the injury
arose" so long as the injury in that country was reasonably foresee-
able.5R Article 10(2) then goes on to provide that (b)-jurisdiction
where the injury arose-"shall not apply to injury caused by anti-trust
violations, in particular price-fixing or monopolization, or conspiracy
to inflict economic loss." 5 9 The immediate purpose of Article 10(2) was
to take effects off the "white list" of required bases for personal
jurisdiction in antitrust cases (discussed in greater detail below), but
another result of this exclusion is to confirm by implication that the
53. Id. art. 18.
54. Id. art. 17.
55. Id. art. 24. Other signatory nations are also not required to enforce judgments in which
jurisdiction is based on Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the white list. See id. art. 25(1).
56. Id. art. 1(1).
57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 471, cmt. f (1987) (noting that the
United States and Great Britain interpret the words "civil and commercial" in the Hague Service
Convention as meaning any proceeding that is not criminal but that German practice appears to
exclude matters involving the enforcement of "public law"). But see Notice on Cooperation
Between National Courts and the Commission in Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty
44, 1993 O.J. (C 39) 6, 11 (stating the view of the European Commission that "competition
judgments are already governed by [the Brussels] Convention where they are handed down in
cases of a civil and commercial nature.") [hereinafter Cooperation Notice].
58. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 10(1). Allowing a defendant to be sued in tort either
where the act that caused the injury occurred or where the injury arose is consistent with the
European Court of'Justice's interpretation of the Brussels Convention. SeeCase 21/76, Handelswek-
erij G.J. Bier BY. v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735, 1749. See generally Ronald A.
Brand, Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral Convention: The Lessons of the Due Process Clause and the
Brussels Convention, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 125 (1998) (discussing tort jurisdiction and the Hague
Judgments Convention).
59. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 10(2).
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Draft Convention does apply to antitrust cases; otherwise, Article 10(2)
would have been unnecessary. 60 The Draft Convention applies, more-
over, not just to antitrust suits filed by private parties but also to civil
suits61 filed by the government, for Article 1(3) provides that "[a]
dispute is not excluded from the scope of the Convention by the mere
fact that a government, a governmental agency or any other person
acting for the State is a party thereto."6 z
At first glance, the inclusion of antitrust in the Draft Convention
would appear to be a step towards greater antitrust enforcement.
Article 25 requires the enforcement of foreign judgments based on
most of the grounds of personal jurisdiction on the white list,63 subject
to a limited number of defenses set forth in Article 28.64 Treble
damages would probably not be recoverable, because Article 33(1)
would allow the country in which enforcement is requested to refuse
enforcement of non-compensatory damages. However, the enforce-
ment of at least single damages would be required.65 The Draft
Convention would thus break the "public law taboo" with respect to
antitrust judgments and would, for example, require the United King-
dom to repeal section 5 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act,
60. This conclusion is confirmed by the drafting history of the Convention. As noted above,
the United Kingdom and the United States wanted to exclude antitrust from the scope of the
Draft Convention but this proposal was defeated. See supra note 8. Article 10(2) was subsequently
proposed by Australia and approved with only the United States voting against. Kovar Interview,
supra note 8.
61. Criminal antitrust prosecutions would not be affected by the Draft Convention since it
applies only to those antitrust cases that may be considered "civil and commercial." See Draft
Convention, supra note 4, art. 1 (1).
62. Id. art. 1(3). The European Commission's extraterritorial application of E.C. competi-
tion law, see, e.g., Case 89/85, In reWood Pulp Cartel, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, would not be limited by the
Draft Convention, because the European Union would not be party to the Convention. The
application of E.C. competition law in the national courts of member countries, as well as the
application of the national competition laws of member countries, would be subject to the Draft
Convention's limitations on personal jurisdiction. For further discussion of the enforcement of
E.C. competition law by national courts, see inria notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
63. See Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 25(1) ("A judgment based on a ground of
jurisdiction provided for in Articles 3 to 13, or which is consistent with any such ground, shall be
recognized or enforced under this Chapter."). Article 25 does not require enforcement of
judgments where jurisdiction is grounded on Articles 14, 15, or 16-dealing with multiple
defendants, counterclaims, and third-party claims, respectively-despite the fact that these bases
ofjurisdiction are on the "white list." Id. art. 25.
64. Id. art. 28.
65. See id. art. 33(1) ("In so far as ajudgment awards non-compensatory, including exemplary
or punitive, damages, it shall be recognized at least to the extent that similar or comparable
damages could have been awarded in the State addressed.").
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Australia to repeal section 9 of the Foreign Proceedings (Excess of
Jurisdiction) Act, and Canada to repeal section 8(1) of the Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act.6 6 A foreign corporation would no longer
be able to avoid an antitrust judgment by keeping its assets outside the
jurisdiction of the court rendering thejudgment.
However, if the Draft Convention is really a step toward greater
international antitrust enforcement, why was the inclusion of antitrust
within the Draft Convention favored by many of the countries that have
traditionally opposed the extraterritorial application of antitrust law
and opposed by the United States, which has traditionally supported
the extraterritorial application of antitrust law?67 The answer lies in the
Draft Convention's limitations on personal jurisdiction, which attempt
to limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.
To see how the Draft Convention would affect antitrust suits, one
should first turn to the "black list" of prohibited bases of jurisdiction
contained in Article 18(2).68 Article 18(2) (e), in particular, states that
the courts of signatory nations shall not exercise personal jurisdiction
solely on the basis of "the carrying on of commercial or other activities
by the defendant in that State, except where the dispute is directly
,related to those activities. "69 U.S. courts would therefore be unable to
exercise general jurisdiction based on "continuous and systematic"
70
business contacts unrelated to the claim. They would be limited to
exercising some form of specific jurisdiction based on the contacts with
the forum out of which the claim arose. However, in many antitrust
cases there are no contacts with the forum from which the claim arises.
66. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 8 & 60.
68. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 18(2). In addition to a "black list," Article 18(1)
contains a "black area": a more general rule prohibiting the exercise of personal jurisdiction "if
there is no substantial connection between that State and the dispute." It is important to note,
however, that the focus in Article 18(1) is not on the connection between the State exercising
jurisdiction and the defendant but on the connection between that State and the dispute. Id. In any
case where there were sufficient effects in the United States for U.S. antitrust laws to be applicable
under Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993), it would be nearly impossible to
argue that there was not a sufficient connection between the United States and the dispute, even if
a particular defendant had no contacts with the United States.
69. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 18(2) (e). "Transient" or "tag" jurisdiction is also
black-listed, see id. art. 18(2) (f), although this basis for personaljurisdiction does not seem to have
played much of a role in civil antitrust enforcement. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
70. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
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Indeed, in some cases, the gist of the complaint is a refusal to do
business with the United States.71
In practice, however, the prohibition of general jurisdiction is un-
likely to restrain the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.
Article 18(2) says that jurisdiction shall not be exercised "on the basis
solely of' one of the bases of jurisdiction on the "black list." 72 Thus, a
U.S. court would be free to use general jurisdiction to satisfy the Due
Process Clause and some other basis of personal jurisdiction on the
"white list" or in the "gray area" to satisfy the Draft Convention. Three
possibilities immediately leap to mind.
First, a U.S. court might rely on Article 10 (1) 's provision for personal
jurisdiction in tort cases. Of course, Article 10(2) provides that effects
jurisdiction is not on the "white list" in antitrust cases, but an antitrust
plaintiff may still bring suit in the courts of a State "in which the act or
omission that caused the injury occurred., 73 The plaintiff might argue
that a failure to sell to or buy from the United States was an "omission"
within the United States under Article 10(1) (a). Interpretation of the
Draft Convention in this way would require U.S. courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction in such a case, and any resulting antitrust judg-
ment would be enforceable in the courts of other signatory countries. 4
Although it is possible that a U.S. court might accept this interpretation
of Article 10 (1) (a), it seems unlikely that the courts of other signatories
would do so because such an interpretation seems contrary to the
purpose of Article 10(2).7 Thus, even if Article 10(1) (a) might provide
a basis for U.S. courts to exercise personal jurisdiction in some antitrust
cases, it is unlikely that the resulting judgments would be enforced
abroad.
71. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
72. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 18(2) (emphasis added).
73. Id. art. 10(1) (a) (emphasis added).
74. See id. art. 25(1) ("Ajudgment based on a ground ofjurisdiction provided for in Articles 3
to 13, or which is consistent with any such ground, shall be recognized or enforced under this
Chapter.").
75. Under the Brussels Convention, differences in national court interpretations may be
resolved by the European Court of Justice. See Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of
Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 29 I.L.M. 1439 (1990). The Draft Convention
contains no similar mechanism for settling differences in interpretation. Thus, short of bringing a
suit before the International Court ofJustice for breach of the Convention, there would be no way
for the United States to require other signatories to abide by its interpretation of the Convention
and no way for the other signatories to require the United States to abide by theirs.
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A second possibility for satisfying the Draft Convention would be to
use effects within the United States as a basis for specific jurisdiction.
Although Article 10(2) takes effects jurisdiction off the "white list" in
antitrust cases, it does not prohibit the exercise of personal jurisdiction
based on effects if consistent with national law. This leaves effects
jurisdiction in Article 17's "gray area" of jurisdictional bases that are
neither required nor prohibited by the Draft Convention. 76 The cur-
rent trend in U.S. courts is to allow effects within the United States to
establish personal jurisdiction in antitrust cases.77 Because effects
jurisdiction is within the Draft Convention's "gray area," however, the
resulting judgment would not be enforceable in the courts of other
signatory countries.
A third possibility presents itself in cases with multiple defendants.
Article 14, for example, allows a plaintiff suing a defendant in the
courts of the defendant's habitual residence to sue non-resident defen-
dants if (1) the claims against the resident and non-resident defendants
"are so closely connected that they should be adjudicated together to
avoid a serious risk of inconsistent judgments";78 and (2) there is a
"substantial connection" between the forum "and the dispute" with
each non-resident defendant.79 In a case involving a conspiracy or
other agreement in restraint of trade with both U.S. and foreign
defendants, 80 therefore, jurisdiction could be asserted under Article
14.81 There would probably be a "substantial connection between [the
United States] and the dispute involving [the foreign defendants]"
82
because of the substantial effects in the United States.83 However, it is
not clear that Article 14(1) (a)'s requirement of a "serious risk of
inconsistent judgments" '8 4 would be met. In the absence of the U.S.
76. See Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 17 ("Subject to Articles 4, 5, 7, 8, 12 and 13, the
Convention does not prevent the application by Contracting States of rules ofjurisdiction under
national law, provided that this is not prohibited under Article 18.").
77. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
78. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 14(1) (a).
79. Id: art. 14(1) (b).
80. See, e.g., United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 904 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
(exercising personal jurisdiction over foreign drug manufacturers on the basis of conspiracy to
affect drug prices in Illinois).
81. In cases not involving a conspiracy in restraint of trade, exercising personal jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant based simply on the forum's connection with "the dispute" under Article
14 would likely violate the Due Process Clause.
82. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 14(1)(b).
83. See supra note 68.
84. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 14(1) (a).
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suit, the foreign conspirators would probably face no liability at all, and
it is not clear that this should be considered an "inconsistent judg-
ment." In any event, even if jurisdiction over the foreign co-conspira-
tors were proper under Article 14, enforcement of the resulting
judgment would not be required under the Draft Convention. Article
25, which sets forth the obligation to enforce judgments from the
courts of other signatories, extends only to judgments based on Articles
3 through 13, omitting Articles 14 to 16 despite their presence on the
"white list."'85
Finally, it is worth noting that the Draft Convention would not
require the United States to evaluate its contacts with foreign antitrust
defendants on a state-by-state basis, rather than a nationwide basis.86
The word "State," as used in the Draft Convention, refers not to the
constituent states of the United States, but rather to the nation-states
that would be parties to the Convention. Thus, a federal court in
California, for example, would be entitled under the Draft Convention
to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based on the
effects of its conduct in the United States as a whole, even if there were
no effects in California.
In sum, the net effect of the Draft Convention on antitrust cases
would probably be very limited. U.S. courts would still be able to
exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in antitrust
cases, and, in general, the resultingjudgments would still be unenforce-
able abroad. Further revisions to the Draft Convention could signifi-
cantly alter the status quo, however. To limit the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law (and achieve the apparent goal of most
non-U.S. members of the Hague Conference), effects jurisdiction in
antitrust cases could be added to Article 18(2)'s "black list." Alterna-
tively, Article 10(2) could be dropped, putting effects jurisdiction in
antitrust cases on the "white list" and rendering such judgments
enforceable under the Draft Convention. Part IV of this Article will
compare these options to the status quo from the perspective of a
smaller country.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR SMALLER COUNTRIES
A country's effectiveness in applying its antitrust law extraterritorially
depends on its ability to obtain jurisdiction over the defendants and its
ability to enforce any resulting judgment against the defendants' assets.
85. See id. art. 25(1).
86. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
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In both of these areas, the United States enjoys a distinct advantage by
virtue of its size. A foreign defendant is likely to have more contacts
with the United States on which personal jurisdiction might be based
and more assets in the United States against which a judgment might
be enforced than is the case with a smaller country. The relatively
greater ability of the United States to engage in extraterritorial anti-
trust enforcement provides one possible explanation for why the
United States has long favored the extraterritorial application of anti-
trust law, while other countries have been more resistant.
Only the European Union has a similar potential to apply its antitrust
law extraterritorially, again by virtue of its size. When imposing fines for
violations of Articles 81 and 82 of the E.C. Treaty,8 7 the European
Commission is not bound like a court by rules of personal jurisdiction,
and fines levied by the Commission are enforceable throughout the
European Union in its members' national courts. 88 Indeed, since the
1980s, the European Union has begun to apply its competition law
extraterritorially in ways that mirror the United States.8°
The Commission has also sought to encourage private enforcement
of E.C. competition law in national courts,90 noting that its own
"administrative resources ... are necessarily limited and cannot be
used to deal with all the cases brought to its attention"9' 1 and that
"[c] ompanies are more likely to avoid infringements of the Community
competition rules if they risk having to pay damages."9 2 A Commission
survey revealed that by the end of 1994, the courts of several member
states were permitting private plaintiffs to recover damages for viola-
87. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, arts. 81 & 82,
1997 OJ. (C 340) 173, 208-09. Prior to 1997, Articles 81 and 82 were numbered Articles 85 and 86,
respectively.
88. Id. art. 256, 1997 OJ. (C 340) at 282 (formerly art. 192).
89. See, e.g., Case 89/85, InreWood Pulp Cartel, 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (applying Article 85 of the
Treaty of Rome extraterritorially on the basis of effects). In the context of merger regulation, the
European Commission has also asserted jurisdiction over the merger of foreign companies, most
famously Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. See Commission Decision 97/816/EC of 30July 1997,
1997 OJ. (L 336) 16 (finding merger compatible with the common market).
90. The European Court of Justice has repeatedly held that Articles 81 and 82 have direct
effect and produce individual rights that national courts must protect. See, e.g., Case 234/89,
Delimitis v. Henninger Briu, 1991 E.C.R. 1-935; Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie v.
Socift Beige des Auteurs Compositeurs et P-diteurs, 1974 E.C.R. 5, 313.
91. See Cooperation Notice, supra note 57,1 13, 1993 OJ. (C 39) at 7.
92. Id. 16, 1993 OJ. (C 39) at 7. The Commission itself has no authority to award such
damages. See id.
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tions of Articles 81 and 82. Here, however, limitations of size begin to
intrude. The European Commission takes the view that national court
judgments enforcing Articles 81 and 82 are enforceable throughout
the European Union under the Brussels Convention. 94 However, na-
tional rules on personal jurisdiction limit national courts in such cases.
A German court could not use a foreign defendant's contacts with
France to establish personal jurisdiction in a private suit for damages in
the same way that a federal court in New York could use a defendant's
contacts with California.
93. See generally The Application of Articles 85 & 86 of the EC Treaty by National Courts in the
Member States, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/
natintro/en/maintoc.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2000). More specifically, the report on France
noted three cases in which the Paris Court of Appeal had awarded damages for infringement of
EC competition rules. See Compliance by Firms with Articles 85 and 86, available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/compeition/antitrust/legislation/naffr/en/frp4.html#tl (last visited Aug.
14, 2000). In the United Kingdom, "There is strong, but not final and binding, authority.., that
damages are recoverable for breach of Articles 85 and 86." See Damages for Infringement of
Articles 85 and 86, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/
natuk/en/ukpl6.html#tl (last visited Aug. 14, 2000); see also Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk
Mktg. Bd., [1984] 1 A.C. 130 (H.L. 1983). The report on Germany stated: "Articles 85 and 86 are
recognized as a Schutznorm (protective rules), within the meaning of § 823(2) BGB. Thus, the
person violating the competition rules is obliged to compensate the victim for the damage arising
therefrom." See Claims for Compensation in Tort, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/antitrust/legislation/natde/en/dep2l.html#tl (last visited Aug. 14, 2000); see also
id. at n.158 (citing cases in German courts). The report on the Netherlands is to the same effect.
See Powers of National Courts, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/
legislation/natnl/en/nlp36.html#tl (last visited Aug. 14, 2000) ("Dutch law acknowledges the
Schutznorm doctrine. Articles 85 and 86 clearly serve to protect private parties against distortions of
competition, so that a breach of one of those Articles may give rise to a claim for damages.").
94. Cooperation Notice, supra note 57, 44,1993 O.J. (C 39) at 11 ("It should be noted that,
in the Commission's view, competition judgments are already governed by this Convention where
they are handed down in cases of a civil and commercial nature."); see Brussels Convention, supra
note 47. The same would presumably be true of judgments for damages under the national
competition laws of the member states.
Judgments or fines resulting from the administrative enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 by
national competition authorities (or from the administrative enforcement of their national
competition laws), by contrast, would probably not fall within the scope of the Brussels Conven-
tion. SeeCooperation Notice, supra note 57, 44, 1993 O.J. (C 39) at 11 (stating that the European
Commission would study the possibility of extending the Brussels Convention to competition
cases assigned to administrative courts). Cf Case 814/79, The Netherlands v. RfIffer, 1980 E.C.R.
3807 (holding thatjudgment in favor of public authority acting in the exercise of its governmental
powers is excluded from the Brussels Convention); Case 29/76, L.T.U. Lufttransportunterneh-
men GmbH v. Eurocontrol, 1976 E.C.R. 1541 (holding the same). In eight out of the 15 member
states of the European Union, administrative authorities can directly apply Articles 81 and 82. See
Application of Articles 85-86 in the Member States, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/antitrust/tabl en.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2000).
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Of course, interest in antitrust enforcement extends beyond the
United States and the European Union and has risen noticeably in the
past decade. Prior to 1990, only twenty-eight countries had some form
of antitrust or competition law.9 5 Today more than eighty countries
have such laws and at least twenty more are in the process of drafting
them.96 One might reasonably expect that at least some of these
countries would want to apply their antitrust laws extraterritorially to
anticompetitive conduct that causes effects within their territories, as
the United States and European Union have done, if only because the
countries in which such conduct occurs have little incentive to prevent
it.9 7 Because the resources available for public enforcement of antitrust
law are limited, one also might reasonably expect at least some of these
countries to encourage private suits for damages, as both the United
States and the European Union have done.98 Malta, however, probably
cannot effectively apply its antitrust law to foreign conduct that harms
its consumers because relatively few potential antitrust defendants
would be susceptible to personal jurisdiction in Malta and have enough
assets there to satisfy ajudgment.99
So long as these obstacles to extraterritorial antitrust enforcement
remain, the only way in which smaller countries can level the playing
field is to limit the ability of bigger countries like the United States to
regulate extraterritorially. They have previously attempted to accom-
plish this through blocking statutes' 00 and are currently trying to
95. See Mark R.A. Palim, The Worldwide Growth of Competition Law: An Empirical Analysis, 43
ANTrITRUST BULL. 105, 109 n.15 (1998) (listing Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Denmark, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
96. International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Final Report 33 & n.1 (2000),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2000); see also
Palim, supra note 95, at 109 & n.15; Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law:
Lessons from and for South Africa and Indonesia, 41 HARv. INT'L L.J. 579 (2000) (discussing
competition laws recently adopted in Indonesia and South Africa).
97. Most countries' antitrust laws do not reach export trade. See Eleanor M. Fox &Janusz A.
Ordover, The Harmonization of Competition and Trade Law-The Case for Modest Linkages of Law and
Limits to Parochial State Action, 19 WORLD CO, p. 5, 17 (Dec. 1995). For further discussion, see infra
notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
98. SeeAgency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) ("the Clayton
Act... bring[s] to bear the pressure of 'private attorneys general' on a serious national problem
for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate.. ."); Cooperation Notice, supra
note 57, 1 13 & 16, 1993 O.J. (C 39) at 7; supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
99. Malta adopted an antitrust law in 1994. Palim, supra note 95, at 109 n.15.
100. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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achieve the same goal through the Draft Convention's limitations on
personal jurisdiction. Another way for smaller countries to level the
playing field, however, would be to enhance their own abilities to
regulate anticompetitive conduct extraterritorially by enhancing their
abilities to assert jurisdiction and to enforce judgments in antitrust
cases on an equal basis with the United States.
In this part of the Article, three different strategies are considered
from the perspective of a smaller country: (1) maintaining the status
quo, under which there are no limitations on personal jurisdiction
beyond those in national law, and antitrust judgments from one
country are not enforceable in another; (2) providing for the enforce-
ment of antitrust judgments but limiting personal jurisdiction in anti-
trust cases, as the Draft Convention unsuccessfully attempts to do; and
(3) providing for the enforcement of antitrustjudgments, but permit-
ting personal jurisdiction on the basis of effects within the forum.
A. Non-Enforcement of Antitrust Judgments Without Limits
on Personal Jurisdiction
The first option would be to maintain the status quo, under which
there are no limits on personal jurisdiction beyond those in national
law, and antitrustjudgments rendered in one country are not enforce-
able in another. This is basically what the Draft Convention does
because, as explained above, in most cases U.S. courts will be able to
use a basis for personal jurisdiction on the Draft Convention's "white
list" or within its "gray area" as a substitute for the general jurisdiction
prohibited by the Draft Convention.1 ' Such judgments will not be
enforceable abroad, however, because jurisdiction will not typically be
exercised on a basis provided in Articles 3 through 13, and it is only to
judgments rendered on one of these bases that the Draft Convention's
enforcement obligation extends.10 2 A more straightforward way of
accomplishing the same end would be simply to exclude antitrust from
the scope of the Draft Convention completely, as initially favored by the
United Kingdom and the United States.1
0 3
From the perspective of a smaller country, the disadvantage of
maintaining the status quo is that it does nothing to eliminate the
101. See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
102. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 25(1) ("A judgment based on a ground of
jurisdiction provided for in Articles 3 to 13, or which is consistent with any such ground, shall be
recognized or enforced under this Chapter."); supra note 85 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 8.
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advantage the United States currently enjoys in the extraterritorial
application of antitrust law by virtue of its size. Because U.S. courts
exercise general jurisdiction based on contacts unrelated to a cause of
action and because a foreign company is likely to have more contacts
with the United States (especially if those contacts are assessed on a
nationwide basis) than with a smaller country, U.S. courts will be able to
exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants in antitrust cases
more often than courts in smaller countries. Similarly, because of the
size of the United States, a foreign company is more likely to have assets
in the United States against which an antitrust judgment can be
enforced than it is to have assets in a smaller country.
B. Enforcement of Antitrust Judgments with Limits on PersonalJurisdiction
Although the current Draft Convention does not provide effective
limits on personal jurisdiction in antitrust cases, it would be relatively
easy to amend the Draft Convention to do so simply by adding effects
jurisdiction in antitrust cases to Article 18(2)'s "black list" and perhaps
by clarifying that the word "omission" in Article 18(1) does not include
a failure to buy from or sell to the State exercising jurisdiction. The
principal advantage of such a convention from the perspective of a
smaller country is that it would eliminate the U.S. advantage in the
extraterritorial application of antitrust law. Neither U.S. courts, nor
those of other countries, would be able to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion in antitrust cases based on contacts unrelated to the antitrust claim
or based on effects or omissions within the forum. Courts in each
country would generally be able to exercise personal jurisdiction only
when there was some anticompetitive conduct within the country from
which the antitrust claim arose.
The problem with such a convention is that it would result in the
systematic under-enforcement of antitrust laws-both U.S. and for-
eign-because it would disable the countries with the greatest incen-
tive to regulate anticompetitive conduct from doing so. 10 4 Anticompeti-
tive conduct results in a transfer of wealth from consumers to producers.
If the consumers are located in one country and the producers in
another, it is only the consumers' country that has an incentive to
regulate the anticompetitive activity. The producers' country has an
incentive to permit it because this anticompetitive activity results in the
104. See Dodge, supra note 12, at 153-58.
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transfer of wealth to its nationals. 10 5 It is for this reason that antitrust
law in the United States and abroad typically exempts anticompetitive
conduct that causes no effects at home.10 6 In the absence of some
international agency charged with antitrust enforcement, the only way
to prevent harmful anticompetitive conduct is to allow any nation that
feels the effects of such conduct to regulate it.1°7
"Positive comity," which allows a nation that feels the effects of
anticompetitive conduct to request enforcement action by the country
where the conduct occurs,'0 8 does not offer a solution to this problem
for two reasons. First, because of exemptions in domestic law for export
cartels and other anticompetitive conduct that does not cause domestic
effects,' 0 9 anticompetitive conduct that causes effects abroad may not
be illegal in the country where it occurs. ° Second, even if the
anticompetitive conduct is illegal in the country where it occurs, the
positive comity provisions in agreements between the United States
105. SeeAndrewT. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. RE'. 1501, 1510-24
(1998) (comparing regulation that maximizes global welfare to regulation that maximizes
national welfare); Fox & Ordover, supra note 97, at 15 ("sales at supra-competitive prices that
extract surplus from foreign consumers and transfer it into the profits of home firms are seen as a
positive contribution"). Even if there are some domestic consumers, it will be in the interests of a
country to permit anticompetitive conduct if the gains to domestic producers (at the expense of
foreign consumers) are greater than the losses to domestic consumers. SeeDodge, supranote 12, at
156-58.
106. See, e.g., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a & 45(a) (3)
(1994) (exempting export commerce that does not cause effects in the United States from the
Sherman Act and FTC Act); Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1994) (exempting
export cartels); Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4016 (1994); Case
174/84, Bulk Oil v. Sun Int'l Ltd., 1986 E.C.R. 559, 589 (holding that Article 85 of the Treaty of
Rome does not apply to anticompetitive conduct that causes effects outside the European Union);
see also Fox & Ordover, supra note 97, at 17 ("Almost all nations either have export exemptions
from their cartel laws, or their law expressly does not reach outbound trade.").
107. SeeJoel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, andJurisdiction,
34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 47, 55 (1993) ("The effects doctrine ... provides a basis for prescriptive
jurisdiction that is exactly congruent with the economic consequences of the conduct, and thus
prevents externalization.").
108. See, e.g., Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the
United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of
their Competition Laws, 39 I.L.M. 1070 (1998) [hereinafter E.C.-U.S. Positive Comity Agree-
ment]. The United States has similar provisions in its antitrust cooperation agreements with
Brazil, Canada, Israel, andJapan.
109. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
110. See The E.C.-U.S. Positive Comity Agreement, supra note 108, art. I (1) (b) (limiting the
agreement to situations in which "[t]he activities in question are impermissible under the
competition laws of the Party in the territory of which the activities are occurring").
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and other countries do not require the country in which the conduct
occurs to take action."' Unless the country where the anticompetitive
conduct occurs is also suffering harm, it will have little incentive to
act.'" 2 Thus, although the U.S. Department of Justice continues to
trumpet "positive comity" as a success, as of April 2000, it had made
only one formal "positive comity" request. 
1 3
In short, prohibiting courts from exercising personal jurisdiction in
antitrust cases, either based on contacts unrelated to the antitrust claim
or based on effects, would certainly limit the extraterritorial applica-
tion of antitrust law, but it would also result in the under-enforcement
of antitrust law by disabling the only countries with an incentive to
prevent antitrust violations from doing so. Only countries that are not
parties to the Convention and supra-national enforcement agencies
like the European Commission would be able to regulate extraterritori-
ally on the basis of effects. A regime in which the European Commis-
sion could apply its competition law extraterritorially, and the United
States could not, might at first glance seem appealing to members of
the European Union, but one must recognize that the Commission
itself has expressed the view that national court enforcement of E.C.
competition law is important to make that law effective. 1 4 Further-
more, the United States would probably not accept limitations on its
ability to regulate extraterritorially without corresponding limitations
on the European Commission'sjurisdiction.
C. Enforcement ofAntitrust Judgments with Effects as a Basis
for PersonalJurisdiction
A final option would be to provide for the enforcement of foreign
antitrustjudgments but permit the use of effects as a basis for personal
jurisdiction in antitrust cases. In the current Draft Convention, this
111. See, e.g., id. art. III.
112. SeeJames R. Atwood, Positive Comity--Is It a Positive Step?, 1992 FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST.
79, 87 (Barry Hawk ed., 1993) ("It is not realistic to expect one government to prosecute its
citizens solely for the benefit of another. It is no accident that this has not happened in thc past,
and it is unlikely to happen in the future.").
113. See Statement of Joel I. Klein, Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, before the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 12, 2000), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/4536.htm ("Our one formal positive comity experi-
ence to date-the referral to the European Commission of possible anticompetitive conduct by
several European airlines with respect to computer reservation systems-has thus far been
successful.").
114. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
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could be accomplished simply by striking Article 10(2), which would
restore jurisdiction over an antitrust case at the place where the injury
arose to the "white list,1 1 5 and require enforcement of any resulting
judgment.' 16
Like the option discussed in the preceding section, this option would
eliminate the current U.S. advantage in extraterritorial antitrust enforce-
ment. With general jurisdiction still on the "black list,',"17 the United
States would be unable to take advantage of its size to aggregate
contacts unrelated to the antitrust claim to establish personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant. The United States would be able to exercise
personal jurisdiction and apply its law extraterritorially to foreign
conduct that caused effects in the United States, but only on the same
basis as other nations. The number of cases in which the United States
could exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants would still
be greater than the number for any smaller country, but it would be
proportionate to the size of the United States, and not, as currently,
disproportionately large in relation to its size.
1 18
Even more significant in reducing the current U.S. advantage would
be the enforceability of antitrustjudgments provided by such a conven-
tion. At the moment, the United States has relatively less need for
foreign enforcement to make its antitrust law effective than smaller
countries do, because of the greater availability of assets in the United
States. With the reciprocal enforcement of antitrustjudgments assured
by a convention, the assets available for enforcing U.S. judgments
would, of course, increase to include the defendant's assets in any
country party to the convention. However, these same assets would be
available to satisfy antitrust judgments from any other country that was
party to the convention. A French judgment in a private suit for
damages against a U.S. company for violating Article 82 would be
enforceable against the U.S. company's assets in the United States." 9
In short, with respect to both jurisdiction and enforcement, the size
115. See Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 10 (1).
116. Seeid.art.25(l).
117. See id. art. 18(2)(f).
118. The current disproportion results from the ability of U.S. courts to exercise general
jurisdiction based on continuous and systematic business contacts. First, the United States appears
to be alone in exercising such jurisdiction. Second, the larger the country, the more likely a
foreign defendant is to have continuous and systematic business contacts with it.
119. Government enforcement of competition law is typically considered an administrative
matter in civil-law countries. To level the playing field with respect to government enforcement of
antitrust law, therefore, the Draft Convention should also be changed to apply to antitrust
judgments obtained in administrative proceedings. This is what the European Commission
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advantage of the United States would be stripped away. Other parties to
the convention would enjoy the same ability to exercise personal
jurisdiction and enforce their judgments in antitrust cases as the
United States.
This would likely affect the dynamics of international antitrust
enforcement in two basic ways. First, countries other than the United
States would find that, for the first time, they could pursue policies of
aggressive extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. Some of these coun-
tries might then decide to do so,just as the European Union-the only
other antitrust enforcer that currently comes close to the size advan-
tages of the United States-has begun to do. Second, the United States
would find that it was increasingly on the receiving end of other
countries' exercise of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction. This might
lead to increased support in the United States for negotiating limita-
tions on extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction or for bringing antitrust
within the jurisdiction of an international organization like the WTO,
neither of which the United States has any incentive to do when it is
virtually the only big fish in the extraterritorial antitrust pond.12 0 In the
United States, the European Commission's review of the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas merger has led to increased interest in multilateral
approaches to antitrust enforcement. 121 More instances in which the
United States was subject to other countries' extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion would likely increase this trend.
V. CONCLUSION
Antitrust is an area in which countries have typically refused to help
each other's courts enforce the law, refusing to enforce foreign judg-
ments and even attempting to thwart litigation through blocking
statutes. The result has been not just a general limitation on the
effectiveness of national antitrust law, but also an advantage for the
United States in applying its antitrust law extraterritorially because of
recommended with respect to the Brussels Convention in 1993. See Cooperation Notice, supra
note 57, 44, 1993 O.J. (C 39), at 11.
120. See Dodge, supra note 12, at 166-67 (noting that countries that have often been subject to
the extraterritorial application of antitrust law have pushed for a more comprehensive interna-
tional antitrust agreement while the United States has generally resisted).
121. See, e.g., Andre Fiebig, A Role for the WTO in International Merger Contro 20 Nw. J. INT'L L.
233 (2000); Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Regulation Across National Borders: The United States of Boeing
versus the European Union of Airbus, 16(1) BROOKINGs REV. 30 (1998); Russell J. Weintraub,
Globalization's Effect on Antitrust Law, 34 NEw ENG. L. REv. 27 (1999). But see A. Douglas Melamed,
International Antitrust in an Age of lnteraational Deregulation, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 437 (1998).
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its size, which makes it easier for the United States to obtain personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants and more likely that those defen-
dants will have assets in the United States against which antitrust
judgments may be enforced.
Including antitrust in the Hague Judgments Convention has the
potential to make both U.S. and foreign antitrust law more effective.
The attempt in the current Draft Convention to limit personal jurisdic-
tion in antitrust cases is misguided. First, the personal jurisdiction
limitations in the Draft Convention will likely have little impact on the
status quo. U.S. courts will be able to substitute a basis for personal
jurisdiction on the "white list" or in the "gray area" for the "black-listed"
general jurisdiction. 12 2 Second, stringent limitations on personal juris-
diction in antitrust cases, although they would reduce the current U.S.
advantage in extraterritorial antitrust enforcement, would also result in
the under-enforcement of antitrust law. Countries must maintain their
ability to regulate extraterritorially based on effects within the forum,
because it is only the country that feels the effects of anticompetitive
conduct that has an incentive to regulate it.12
The best alternative for all the parties to the Hague Judgments
Convention negotiations is to provide for personal jurisdiction on the
basis of effects and make the resulting judgments enforceable by
striking Article 10 (2) from the Draft Convention. Each country would
then have an equal ability to exercise personal jurisdiction on the basis
of effects within the forum' 24 and an equal ability to look to the assets
of the defendant in any signatory country for satisfaction of a judg-
ment. The result would be a regime for the extraterritorial enforce-
ment of antitrust law that is both effective and fair.
122. See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
124. General jurisdiction would remain on Article 18(2)'s "black list," removing any advan-
tage the United States might gain from its ability to aggregate a defendant's unrelated business
contacts.
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